




# **How to create a sound and stable investment climate in Europe for gas infrastructure?**

**GIE Annual Conference  
Edinburgh, June 2011**

[www.sundenergy.com](http://www.sundenergy.com)

# Sund Energy helps navigate into the energy future...



...by understanding the full picture of stakeholders

# Politicians have ambitious dreams and aspirations...

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## Internal markets – good solution for all

- Integrating the national markets is at the heart of the EU
- Competition, free flow of gas and electricity, learning and assisting

## Overall policy on reduced emissions and imports

- Less expensive imports fund some “domestic” energy
- Efficiency reduces emissions + need for more energy

## Infrastructure is needed, but so far vague indications of value

- Long distance import for “security of supply”?
- Smart grid for efficiency – or better use of renewables?
- New generation capacity – to replace imports and reduce emissions

## So far, behind schedule for 20-20-20

- Extra wanted – just in case?
  - Not confident of reaching all of their goals?
- Who should pay for that?

# The future is integrated, ambitious, but not base load!

## Gas investment needed to 2020


EU policy Scenarios	Gas infrastructure investment need 2010-2020 €bn
BAU	44.7
Policy set S1	49.7
Policy set S2	47.2
Policy set S3	57

### Several incentives from EU:

- Price – mixed message...
- Regulated tariffs – ex ante or ex post – WACC changes
- Other support


### Still less than 80% expected...

- Different perceptions of risk



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# The EU gas imports may not increase as much...



Source: European commission (2010), Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond – A blueprint for an integrated European energy network.

## ...and it will be less base load than before!

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### **Gas is wanted to balance wind, mainly – or so they say today**

- This requires flexibility, which is costly, especially in storage
  - What will the price and use be then?
- What if nuclear is reduced and wind does not take off as expected?
  - Gas cheaper than coal with CCS?

### **Some believe in unconventional gas, even in Europe**

- What if Poland becomes an exporter by 2030?
  - Many countries in south east Europe have potential, too
- This could impact energy mix, geopolitics and need for infrastructure!

**How to match the desire for flexibility in the market with the comfort in base load among infrastructure investors?**

# So, how much new infrastructure is really needed?

## In lower scenarios, none!

- Some nice-to-have

## In higher scenarios, more


- But perhaps not all that are hoped for

## Easier to build small and stepwise solutions

- Lower risk
- More adaptable
- Some flex in location

## Circular effects

- Price impacts flow, impacts bottlenecks etc



**Figure 2, in Mtoe**

Source: European commission impact assessment accompanying document (2010), Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond – A blueprint for an integrated European energy network.

# And let's remember – much gas infrastructure is there!

## Some of the existing will loose out on new

- Recent investments will have less income with competing new solutions

## Long lead times

- 5-10 years from idea to delivery – much can change: Need, other solutions, prices, etc

## Some of the planned compete

- Easier not to do it...



# UK has plenty of gas infrastructure now – too much?

## UK wanted infrastructure (end of 90s)

- Strong political suggestion to build the Interconnector
- Derogation from Gas Directive for additional investments
- Promise of connections by National Grid
- High winter prices also worked

## Then there was too much!

- Qatar and Norway both acted on signals – spread fell
- Other LNG import expanded, too, adding to UK “favourite port for LNG”
- Now there is an export bottleneck – who would have thought!
- All suppliers suffer with lower prices, but good for users...

## So, if capacity is to be booked for “nice to have” – how?

- Which project is best to book by whom? – competition of routes?
- How much booking is needed?
- What are alternatives?

## What can we learn? Lead times, listening, adjusting?

# Security of supply – from volume to price, really?

## Last century

- Fear of revolutions in Russia and Algeria reason for diversification
- Focus on physical supplies and avoidance of disruptions
- This was seen as well worth more money and longer contracts
- Other geopolitical aspects also, especially during cold war...

## Now we have different times

- Disruptions less feared than before – prices feared more
- Even during “Arabian spring” this has not been prominent
  - Several costs related to this: oil prices, future LNG investments, lower economic growth – all impacting the EU
- Oversupply helps, of course – but sellers want security of demand...

## What is the real risk to manage?

- Disruptions can be managed in many ways – reversing flow, LNG, etc
  - How much redundancy is needed, who pays for it and what is acceptable risk of it not being used?
- Exposure to expensive imports?

# Size isn't everything – distance, source, alternatives...



**Map 8: Comparison of distances of main Eastern gas supplies to main EU consumption hubs**

**Source:** European commission (2010), Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond – A blueprint for an integrated European energy network.

# Skanded – an exercise between two worlds, too early?

## Norway has for many years followed the model of evacuating gas

- State wanted long term contracts to be in place before fields developed
  - Developers then build pipelines with same ownership as field
- Now effective/integrated export machine, with some non-oil investors
  - Gassco architect – much focus on next steps for expansion
  - Pension funds happy to get regulated/assured returns
- This model did not give infrastructure to the nearest markets

## Skanded was planned by TSOs and downstream companies

- Group of potential investors from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Poland
  - Wanted competition and SoS, and saw the value of capacity
  - Synergies in connecting several markets enroute to Poland
- Very different business model from normal Norwegian exports
  - No long term gas contracts wanted by buyers – not allowed, either
- EU offered support and Norwegian governmental entity entered
  - Petoro: “Financial crisis could give uncertainty in markets”, “lack of need for new export markets” and better to debottleneck Gassled...

# Often, surprises when investments are “late”

## **Expectation that infrastructure is attractive – depends on drivers**

- Producers want to enable new sales
- Users want own facilities, often LNG, as option to negotiate price
- TSOs want well functioning systems and facilitating competition + SoS
- Pension companies mature assets with regulated returns

## **EU and other politicians want to show action**

- New generation technology is considered even more attractive
  - Offshore wind, CCS, smart grids etc
- Many technology developers announce money needs for new solutions
  - Implicitly, politicians have then “done their bit”
  - Still, there is no guarantee of large scale investments!

## **Politics matter more than many think – even in “free markets”**

- Choice of energy mix, support to technology, new generation etc
- Vague indications of preferences vary and make planning more difficult
- This is perceived as political risk by many potential investors!

# Suppliers learning from the EU – much same logic!

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## Diversified markets

- Spread risks, so more to Asia than otherwise

## Flexibility value

- Different flow and less need for storage with plentiful variable gas

## Experience in previous investments

- Bad experiences will impact “guts” next time!

## So, the producers are slowly becoming more focused on prices

- But do we like it?
- More and more politicians are now saying they do NOT want price to balance the market, but prefer a steady price for all at all times
- That is more like oil, where we pay a premium for spare capacity...

# Decisions and perceived risks are changing

## **Traditional model: Wrap steel around gas to be “evacuated”**

- Still some using this logic – especially associated gas
  - Unbundling will give some investments in “captive market” of fields

## **Late last century: Interconnectors by upstream/midstream**

- Very good for EU targets of competition and SoS – less for producers
- Harmonising markets and value in capacity (even without flow)

## **Last 5-10 years: Less new capacity needed, but downstream value**

- “Nice to have” and still good for competition & SoS – nice enough?
  - Gate, Nabucco, and more suggested when shortage of gas/LNG expected
- Several stopped/paused for different reasons
  - Financial crisis, lack of resources, lack of markets, lack of regulation...

## **Next: Smaller, more robust solutions OR clear payability?**

- More agile solutions, such as smaller LNG, could be easier to lift
- Bookings by EU or TSOs for “nice to have” capacity
- Transition away from baseload, extrapolist thinking!

# Another new element in investors: CSR

## Corporate social responsibility is growing – could include SoS!

- Would Nordstream fall into this category?
- Public service obligation easier within each country than outside EU
- Many large companies see that pleasing stakeholders/politicians help
- Important in the new group of investors in infrastructure: Pension funds

## But, how kind should an investor be, and what is the alternative?

- Often gas industry is focused on CSR related to local community
- Helping the EU may be nice, but does it get recognised enough?
  - What is the experience of Nordstream and Southstream here?
  - Or when some TSOs have moved into other countries, EU applauds and national regulator changes terms...

## Many alternatives that may give more points for less money

- Fighting malaria, sponsoring the arts/sports etc

# Price – from two sides?

## Sellers are to be attracted by high prices

- To justify investments for new flow
- EU sees transport as “only a small percentage” of price
- Market wants lower prices now – and have started getting it!

## Balancing mechanism?


- Impact on storage needs?
- UK export bottleneck

## Oversupply + redundancy

- Good for budgets but not for PL/LNG or storage?

- The extreme volatility of commodities prices hinders our ability to invest;
- Dialog between suppliers and buyers must continue to keep adapting long term contracts to the current situation.

**GDF SUEZ**



# Now we have a complex picture...

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## **Price was an incentive for infrastructure for a while**

- Less so now, with less spreads and oversupply
- Some “burnt” and less interested than before

## **Unbundling supply and infrastructure**

- Price less relevant to institutional investors

## **Competition of routes**

- Good for option to flow, but value?

## **Southern corridor vs reversible flow**

- Both needed fully?

## **What is best for the market/the investors/the EU?**

- Who is qualified to tell?
  - Voters, politicians, entso, others?
- Strong and differing opinions in all camps
  - Energy mix, climate, value of SoS, and how it will all work together – or not!

## ...and some improvements are surprisingly easy

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### **All: Talk together – and understand the other side!**

- What some find attractive, others don't
  - Especially between government and private sector
- Some like spreads and some want steady prices

### **Politicians: The cheapest tool is to reduce political risk!**

- Current picture is “please build Nabucco but it may not be needed”...
- Avoid adding to uncertainty in words and actions!
- Fixing red tape is not enough

### **Investors: Adapt the hardware to the new, uncertain situation**

- Infrastructure that does not need base load flow is more robust!
- Capacity booking, reversible flows, options, virtual deals
- Smaller, stepwise, multitasking, if possible

# In addition some innovation on the commercial side?

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## Two main private investor groups today

- Traditional energy players used to risk and upside, but more in energy
- Pension funds and other financial investors wanting regulated returns
- Both are needed, but have different preferences

## Perhaps possible to differentiate incentives?

- One element of fixed returns with capacity bookings – best for pension
- Another element with higher upside and more risk, related to flow
  - Best “parked” with energy companies (upstream or downstream)

## If the market is to book capacity – who does it?

- Large buyers or sellers already do this in pipelines and LNG
- TSOs should be able to do it – still mainly national
- ENTSO or others best for the “greater good”?

# We are happy to discuss further!

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## **Selected recent work by Sund Energy that may be of interest**

- Impact of Japan on LNG prices – why the market expected too much
- Gas for transportation (road + sea) – market impacts
- Unconventional gas – impact on European markets
- Security of supply – values and possible solutions
- CCS – rethinking solutions for attractiveness
- LNG – new areas of use and infrastructure

## **We also offer strategic and commercial advice**

- Producers, TSOs, traders, large buyers, governments
- Gas, electricity, CCS and more

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